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Implementation Science and Bioethics: Lessons from European Empirical Bioethics Research?  
We welcome this paper from Sisk et al, which argues that principles of implementation science 
ought to be incorporated into ethics research. We view this work as closely connected to the large 
literature on empirical bioethics coming out of Europe (and elsewhere), which has made similar 
points about the need to ensure, when conducting research and forming recommendations, that 
those recommendations are feasible (Ives et al, 2017; Huxtable & Ives, 2019,). Empirical bioethics 
seems to have arisen, at least in part, as a response to what Hedgecoe (2004) refers to as the ‘social 
science critique’ of a bioethics dominated by abstract philosophical approaches, and which is 
therefore ill-suited to the task of formulating real world solutions to real world problems. The way 
that we, and others, have responded to this challenge has been to explore methodologies that 
integrate empirical and ethical analysis, in a way that “respects the sound empirical point that facts 
and values are not distinct in practice, but that also does not fall foul of the is/ought problem as 
defined in philosophical terms.” (Ives and Draper, 2010. p254). Whilst the focus has been very much 
on engaging with ‘practical ought questions’ (Dunn et al, 2012), most work has been concerned with 
questions of epistemology, justification, and research methodology (Ives et al, 2019).  
In their paper, Sisk at al. start from a similar premise in claiming that “when we draw conclusions in 
the realm of ethics, we are actually making choices regarding actions. Normative claims that are not 
(or cannot) be put into practice might have aspirational value, but these norms fail to fulfil the 
essential function of ethics if they do not eventually lead to ethical actions.” (Sisk et al 2020, px). This 
mirrors the social science critique insofar as it frames as problematic any ethics research which 
studies theoretical problems and offers theoretical solutions, without paying attention to the social 
worlds in which ethical decision-making actually takes place. They also, however, seem to take an 
extra step in saying that good and effective ethics research cannot only be about drawing 
conclusions that are relevant, feasible, and have real world purchase (goals embraced by European 
empirical bioethics), but that properly functioning ethics research must bring about change. They 
thus take their thinking in a different direction and, as their title suggests, are less concerned with 
avoiding the move from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, and more with facilitating the move from ‘ought’ to ‘is’. The 
way to manage this is to build implementation science into ethics research.  
Whilst broadly supportive of any move to make ethics research more practical and relevant – as we 
hope is evident from our previous work in this area – we have a few concerns about the way that 
Sisk et al make their proposal. First, their account (as written) appears inattentive to some important 
issues and, second, there are potentially problematic implications of their account. We will begin 
with the latter, as this is easier to explain, and this leads into the former, which we feel is more 
substantive.  
Sisk et al’s paper appears to take for granted a framing of ‘bioethics’ as a particular form of 
philosophical inquiry, and this framing of bioethics is then problematised and used as the jumping- 
off point from which they offer their proposal. This framing is evident in the way the authors 
describe what can be expected of an ethicist, how an ethicist should work, and in their implicit 
claims about the traditional role of the ethicists:  
“Ethicists cannot be expected to master every role necessary for the implementation of 
specific norms. However, it should be the responsibility of ethicists to help form and 
participate in multidisciplinary, collaborative teams with others who possess the 
necessary content knowledge, skillsets, experiences, and political connections within 
the relevant inner and outer settings to facilitate the success of an intervention. Doing 
so is outside the traditional role of ethicists, but it is imperative if ethicists hope to fulfil 
the overarching goal of ethics – supporting ethical practice in the real world.” (px)  
Here, the authors portray a version of bioethics that would be difficult to recognise in Europe, where 
bioethics is generally viewed as an interdisciplinary field. As Ives (2014) has noted elsewhere:  
“Bioethics has (arguably) always been an interdisciplinary field, and the rise of ‘empirical’ (bio)ethics 
need not be seen as an attempt to give a new name to the longstanding practice of interdisciplinary 
collaboration (as some have suggested), but can perhaps best be understood as a substantive 
attempt to engage with the nature of that interdisciplinarity and to articulate the relationship 
between the many different disciplines (some of them empirical) that contribute to the field.” 
(p302).  
That said, this account also positions the philosophical ethicist as the person who determines the 
correct answer and then seeks help from other disciplines in order to ensure that their answer is 
implemented. This mirrors the ‘handmaiden’ problem, perhaps most clearly articulated by Erica 
Haimes (2002; cf Hedgecoe 2004), which holds as highly problematic a research relationship where 
other disciplines are subservient to their philosophical master. The account of bioethics implied by 
Sisk et al, and the solution offered, fails to recognise the already interdisciplinary nature of bioethics 
and reinforces a problematic handmaiden relationship. It also suggests that any ethics researcher 
must also be an activist – someone who aims from the outset to bring about change in the 
world.This is potentially a limited view of what it is to be a bioethicist and, at the very least, the 
relationship between bioethics and activism is more complex than is acknowledged (Draper et al, 
2019)  
It remains, of course, an open question about what kind of bioethics is best, but what we find 
troubling is the evident lack of engagement with this issue, especially given the ink that has been 
spilled on it. Our first concern is that this is indicative of a relatively myopic engagement with 
bioethics outside of the US (not by any means limited to these authors) which may both lead to 
much work – and time – being spent needlessly rehashing debates, not to mention sowing division 
by moulding promising research from US bioethics as separate and parallel to, rather than iterative 
with, progress in Europe.  
Our more substantive concern follows from the implicit framing of bioethics above, which casts the 
philosophical bioethicist as the decision-maker who draws on the expertise of others to ensure that 
their conclusions are implemented. The idea seems to be that, by working with implementation 
sciences from the outset, ethicists can ensure that the conclusions they draw will be implemented 
and have an effect in practice. This, however, appears to ignore the vital question of how we 
determine which conclusions ought to be implemented. Facilitating the move from ‘ought’ to ‘is’ is 
important, but it is only warranted once we have established a justified ‘ought’, and one potential 
danger of building implementation science into the fabric of ethics research is that we become very 
good at effecting change but risk, in so doing, making unjustified compromises in decisions about 
what the change ought to be. It is precisely this risk that the European empirical bioethics literature 
has been focussing on – developing methodologies (both method and epistemology) that allow us to 
consult with others, consider the practical aspects of ethical decisions, entertain compromise, take 
into account the needs of policy, and still produce ethically justifiable and defensible conclusions 
that we can feel confident ought to be implemented.  
What we have arguably paid insufficient attention to in our work is how to bring about that change – 
assuming simply that if we conduct a form of research that is theoretically rigorous, attentive to the 
lived reality of stakeholders, and attentive to the practical demands of policy, that will be enough. 
Sisk et al. challenge us to go further. We offer a different kind of challenge in return. We see a 
danger in focussing on implementation and paying insufficient attention to justification – and we risk 
the tail of impact wagging the dog of scholarship.  
We broadly welcome Sisk et al’s contribution because, done well, we are convinced that the 
inclusion of implementation science could bring significant benefits to bioethics. The challenge to us 
all is to think carefully about how to do it well. For our part, we see implementation science as being 
one other discipline to bring into the fold of our research, with a view to thinking more carefully and 
systematically about how we develop our conclusions and form them in a way that is amenable to 
impact. At the same time, however, we must remain humble and accept that our conclusions might 
be wrong – and therefore think twice before assuming our conclusions are the correct ones to drive 
change before we try to bring it about. We must also be attentive to the risks of including 
mechanisms to achieve impact into ethics research that might change the nature of the normative 
conclusion we draw, so that we do not move too quickly into facilitating an ‘is’ without a properly 
justified ‘ought’.  
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